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Abstract
We examine the effect of corporate governance on the collateral requirements for firms’ bank
loans in China. We find that firms with lower excess control rights and other large
shareholders face lower collateral requirements, which is more pronounced in non-SOEs than
in SOEs. Regarding board characteristics, we find that smaller board size, more independent
directors, separation of the positions of CEO and chairman, and larger supervisory board size
can reduce a firm’s use of collateral; the effect of all the preceding characteristics is more
pronounced in SOEs. Overall, our research suggests that, in China, corporate governance
structures are able to affect bank lending decisions in respect of collateral requirements, and
that the influence depends on the controlling shareholder type and associated agency
problems.
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1. Introduction
An evolving literature is beginning to focus on the agency conflicts faced by creditors in
modern corporations (Anderson et al., 2004; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Boubakri and
Ghouma, 2010; Lin et al., 2011). In principle, creditors face two types of agency conflict. The
first is the conflict between creditors and firm managers. The separation between ownership
and control leads to moral hazard problems and managerial self-serving behaviours, at the
expense of shareholders and creditors. The second is the conflict between creditors and
controlling shareholders. In firms with concentrated ownership, controlling shareholders have
incentives to expropriate other investors, which incentives might be more significant when
other investors are creditors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Lin et al., 2011). These agency
conflicts will reduce the expected value of cash flows to the firms and creditors, and increase
the probability that the firms will face financial distress. As a firm’s financial distress will
increase the credit risks faced by creditors, creditors will require higher collateral to protect
their interests in case of default (Menkhoff et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2013).
Meanwhile, another strand of literature has documented that effective governance
mechanisms can mitigate the agency conflicts between creditors and manager/controlling
shareholders, and thereby decrease the probability of financial distress and the associated
credit risks faced by creditors (Anderson et al., 2004; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006).
Consistent with this view, existing studies with cross-country evidence indicate that
borrowers with better governance are rewarded with lower collateral requirements (e.g.,
Francis et al., 2012; Ge et al., 2012). However, Larcker et al. (2007) argue that existing
studies do not show a consensus on the appropriate measurement of corporate governance
indicators or of the number of corporate governance dimensions. This prompts a question:
how do various governance mechanisms affect collateral requirements by creditors? In
particular, the present study investigates the governance mechanisms through which the
financial distress faced by firms and credit risks faced by creditors can be mitigated.
To answer this question, the relationship between corporate governance and the use of
collateral in loan contracts is examined, using a sample of China’s listed firms. This
examination is motivated by the contrasting views on this subject which currently exist. On
the one hand, it has been argued that the corporate governance of China’s listed firms is
designed simply to meet the regulatory requirements of the Chinese Securities Regulatory
Commission (CSRC); and Liu (2006) argues that the corporate governance model adopted in
China “has demonstrated many built-in weaknesses, which makes it less effective in
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disciplining management/controlling shareholders”1. On the other hand, a growing number of
studies are beginning to document that corporate governance has become more effective,
especially since 2005 when listed firms were required to complete the split-share structure
reform (Huyghebaert and Wang, 2012; Liu et al., 2015). Thus, it is worthwhile to examine
whether corporate governance is an effective monitoring mechanism to benefit creditors. In
addition, rather than relying on the corporate governance index or country-specific
governance (e.g., Francis et al., 2012; Ge et al., 2012), this paper explores the role of actual
corporate governance practices within the two-tier board structure. Moreover, we are
interested in examining the effect of governance, as measured by the excess control rights of
controlling shareholders and other large shareholder ownership, on the use of collateral. We
then further investigate how corporate governance interactively works with the ownership
structure in affecting the use of collateral.
China’s environment is an excellent laboratory in which to conduct this research for the
following reasons. Firstly, China’s listed firms exhibit concentrated ownership, and in many
cases the controlling shareholder is the government, an individual or a family. This indicates
that the controlling shareholder has substantial control over the firm, and potentially exposes
creditors to severe expropriation and credit risks. However, the dominant agency conflicts
vary across different types of owners. In state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the excess control
rights held by the government are mainly driven by the incentive of the central government
needing to separate SOEs from political interference and to decentralize decision rights to
SOE managers (Fan et al., 2013). Nevertheless, insulated from the pyramid’s top owners,
SOE managers may be induced into severe managerial agency problems; so that creditors
mainly face agency conflicts with firm management. In non-SOEs, controlling shareholders
have a strong incentive to enhance their ultimate control through excess control rights, and to
extract private benefits; while managerial agency problems are mitigated due to the fact that
controlling shareholders usually have an incentive to monitor managers (Boubakri and
Ghouma 2010; Cao et al., 2011); thus, creditors usually face agency conflicts with controlling
shareholders in non-SOEs. Therefore, we are able to assess how better governance
mechanisms interact with the type of ownership control to prevent financial distress, and how
the collateral requirements of creditors are determined.
Secondly, we intend to shed light on the impact that the supervisory board has on the use
of collateral, which is an important but unexplored aspect of corporate governance; although
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the supervisory board in China still lacks the power to appoint and dismiss executive
directors, in contrast to the corporate governance approach in Germany and Japan. Lastly,
China also provides a unique opportunity for examining collateral requirements because of
the government’s tight control over interest rates during our sample period, which severely
limited creditors’ use of loan pricing to differentiate across borrowers with different levels of
risk (Podpiera, 2006; Koivu, 2009)2. In developed markets, lenders are able to price loans
through both interest rates and pledging collateral, so that they face a potential endogeneity
issue where ownership structure, corporate governance and collateral requirements might
have a joint impact on interest rates. This joint setting of interest rates and collateral
requirements, in most other countries, may contaminate any observed causal relationship
between ownership structure, corporate governance and collateral requirements. From this
perspective, because our study is based on China, there will be less concern over endogeneity.
Briefly, the results reveal that governance mechanisms influence the use of collateral in
China’s listed firms, but that their effects differ according to ownership structure. Firstly, we
find that the use of collateral is lower for firms in which controlling shareholders have lower
excess control rights, or in which other large shareholders have larger ownership; and that
this relationship is stronger in non-SOEs than in SOEs. In terms of a two-tier board structure,
the results show that the use of collateral is lower for firms with a smaller board of directors,
more independent directors, separate chairman and CEO positions, or a larger supervisory
board; and that this relationship is stronger in SOEs than in non-SOEs. In addition, the
expertise of the supervisory board helps firms to reduce the use of collateral, which is more
significant for non-SOEs. These results confirm that different property rights and dominant
agency problems exist between SOEs and non-SOEs. Therefore, internal corporate
governance, such as a two-tier board structure, is more effective in reducing the use of
collateral, by constraining the agency conflicts between creditors and management, in SOEs;
while governance by other blockholders is more effective in reducing the use of collateral, by
alleviating agency conflicts between creditors and controlling shareholders, in non-SOEs.
This research contributes to the literature in several ways. Firstly, fresh evidence proving
how internal governance affects firms’ use of collateral has here been presented. Extant
evidence shows that corporate governance can prevent controlling shareholders from
tunnelling, and can increase firm value (e.g. Bai et al., 2004). This research extends the
2

This situation confirms the view that collateral is used to protect banks’ interests from defaulting by borrowers.
This also addresses the alternative view that high-quality borrowers are likely to pledge more collateral to enjoy
a lower interest rate (Besanko and Thakor, 1987), because regulation of interest rates in China prevents them
from doing this.
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literature by providing evidence that, when designing loan contracts, banks consider how
internal governance can reduce their credit risks. Moreover, in a departure from the study by
An et al. (2014), who examined the effect of ownership structure on the use of collateral, we
move further to investigate how corporate governance interacts with ownership structure in
affecting the use of collateral. Thus, we provide a complementary perspective to their study.
Secondly, our study provides additional evidence regarding the effectiveness of
governance by a two-tier board system. This is a structure that consists of a board of directors
and a supervisory board, and is a typical feature of the German and Japanese governance
systems. Although Chinese supervisory boards resemble the German and Japanese
governance structure, they have evolved over a relatively short period. Thus, the
effectiveness in China of this two-tier board system remains an empirical question. Our
results suggest that both the board of directors and the supervisory board are able to exert
effective monitoring over the management and reduce the credit risks, thus reducing the use
of collateral.
Finally, this paper also provides evidence of the determinants of collateral requirements
in emerging markets. Menkhoff et al. (2006) and Menkhoff et al. (2012) find that the need for
collateral is higher in less developed markets, and that borrowers can overcome the threat of a
lack of collateral by substitutes such as third party guarantees and banking relationship. This
paper complements their studies, and provides evidence of the effects of governance
mechanisms, in Chinese listed firms, on the collateral required by banks; and that these
effects are dependent on the type of ownership structure a firm has and its dominant agency
problems.
The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the Chinese
institutional environment and then develops the hypotheses. Section 3 outlines the data and
methodology. Section 4 reports the results of the empirical analyses. Section 5 provides
additional tests; and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Institutional background and hypothesis development
2.1 Institutional background
2.1.1 Ownership structure
China began its transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-based economy in
1978. Under the communist system, China’s governments collected revenue from SOEs and
provided financing to those firms out of the state budget, so there was no need for risk
management by banks in the use of collateral. When SOE reform began, the government tried
to give autonomy to SOEs by linking rewards to performance and relinquishing its
5

shareholding. That was followed, in the early 1980s, by the adoption of the “loan for (fiscal)
grant” (bo gai dai) scheme, which aimed at increasing financial incentives and hardening the
budget constraints faced by SOEs. A new phase of reform began in 1984, when the
separation between management and ownership was further emphasized. In 1993, a new goal
of establishing a modern enterprise system was set for SOE reform, which resulted in many
SOEs being restructured into joint stock companies and being listed on the stock exchanges
in Shanghai and Shenzhen, with shares sold to the public. However, governments at various
levels still retained enough shares to exercise control. Some of the equity carved out of SOEs
is now majority-owned by private investors, and there is a growing number of private firms
that are now listed. During our sample period, non-SOEs comprise 44% of the sample.
Another characteristic of Chinese firms is that they usually have controlling
shareholders. In some cases, the controlling shareholders own the firms directly as the largest
shareholders. In other cases, controlling shareholders establish a pyramidal structure and own
firms through the chain of ownership indirectly. In these firms, the control rights of the
controlling shareholders are measured as the weakest link in the chain of ownership, and cash
flow rights are measured by the product of ownership along the chain. For example,
controlling shareholder (firm A) owns 70% of the shares in firm B, which in turn owns 50%
of the shares in firm C. In this sense, firm A is the controlling shareholder of firm C. The
controlling shareholder (firm A) owns 50% of control rights (which is its ownership) and
35% of cash flow rights of firm C, while the largest shareholder of firm C is firm B, which
has 50% of ownership of firm C. In this case, the controlling shareholder’s ownership is the
same as that of the largest shareholder. In some other cases, the controlling shareholder’s
ownership can be different from the largest shareholder’s ownership 3. During our sample
period, it was revealed that, on average, the controlling shareholder owns 37.1% of a firm, the
largest shareholder owns 36.6% of a firm, and the second largest shareholder owns 8.46% of
a firm; which indicates that the controlling shareholder has substantial control over the firm.
In line with recent literature, we investigate the influence of corporate governance on the
collateral requirements of China’s listed companies, and how these effects vary based on the
type of controlling shareholders.
2.1.2 Two-tier board structure
3

One example of this is that firm A owns 40% of the shares in firm B, which in turn owns 50% of the shares in
firm C. In this case, the controlling shareholder of firm C is firm A, which owns 40% of firm C. Another
example is that firm A owns 70% of shares in both firm B and firm C, which are both shareholders of firm D,
with 40% ownership. In this case, the controlling shareholder of firm D is firm A, which owns 80% ownership
of firm D.
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These listed firms are governed by two-tier boards that are similar to the German and
Japanese corporate governance approach, and consist of a supervisory board and a board of
directors. The Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Firms in China, published by the
Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), expanded on Company Law by
specifying the duties and responsibilities of directors in greater detail. Following this
guideline, the board of directors was made accountable to shareholders, and was instructed to
treat all shareholders equally and to take care of the interests of the firm’s various
stakeholders. In 2001, the independent director system was mandated by the CSRC, which
required that at least one third of the board members of listed firms should be independent
directors by June 30, 2003. The CSRC also strongly encouraged firms to separate the roles of
chairman and CEO. However, China introduced the concept and culture of the modern
corporation while extending the reforms of the state-owned economy. Although the
responsibilities and duties of directors closely paralleled those in the West, it is doubtful
whether they played a positive governance role in China, because the Chinese laws and
guidelines are silent on who must propose directors; so that, in practice, large owners tend to
appoint directors and their representatives to dominate the board (Wu et al., 2009).
According to Company Law, a listed company must also have a supervisory board that
consists of no less than three members, including representatives of the shareholders of the
company’s employees and workers. According to Company Law, the supervisory board
mainly carries out financial monitoring functions, which include examining the company’s
financial status and supervising the actions of the directors and managers to prevent any
violations of laws, regulations, or the company’s by-laws. It also states that supervisory
members should have professional knowledge and work experience in accounting and law. A
key difference between a board of directors and a supervisory board is that supervisors of the
company cannot concurrently serve as its directors, managers, or financial officers, so that
they are expected to oversee the performance of the directors and senior management in a
relatively impartial manner (Dahya et al., 2003; Firth et al., 2007a, b; Ding et al., 2009 and
Ding et al. (2010).
Although the supervisory board in China still lacks the power to appoint and dismiss
executive directors, unlike in the German and Japanese approach to corporate governance, the
latest Company Law Amendment 2005 largely addresses several important constraints that
prevented supervisory boards from functioning properly. Firstly, supervisory boards now do
have the power to recommend the dismissal of directors and members of top management
who have been convicted of crimes, and to sue directors and members of top management
7

who commit fraud. Secondly, supervisors were already allowed to attend board meetings; but
the latest amendment gives them the right to ask questions and make suggestions.
Furthermore, supervisory boards now have the right to submit proposals to shareholder
meetings. Finally, when the board of supervisors discovers something unusual in the
operation of the company, it can conduct an investigation into the operating situation, with
the company bearing the expense.
Overall, the present paper adds to the literature by means of a detailed investigation of
the impact of internal governance on collateral requirements, which has not been previously
examined.
2.1.3 Banking structure and bank lending policies
In the early 1980s, the government established four wholly state-owned banks (the Big Four),
which took control of all the lending functions of the People’s Bank of China (the central
bank). Later, in 1994, three wholly state-owned policy banks were established and took over
policy lending from the Big Four banks. By 1996, joint stock commercial banks and city
banks had begun to emerge.
Originally, bank loans mainly took the form of credit loans granted at low interest rates
and without any guarantees or collateral. This, among other factors, resulted in a higher ratio
of non-performing loans (NPLs). As the market-oriented economy developed, banks became
increasingly aware of loan risk, and from the 1990s they increasingly demanded guarantees
or collateral. Indeed, according to a survey of 13 domestic banks between 2000 and 2005, the
average collateral for secured loans – of which land or buildings became the most acceptable
form – increased from 22% to 32% of all loans granted (Yang and Qian, 2008). Banks also
demanded the equivalent value of fixed assets as collateral before granting loans, especially
to privately controlled firms (Yeung, 2009). Meanwhile, before March 1998, the People’s
Bank of China recommended the interest rate for lending by commercial banks, and allowed
fluctuations around this recommended standard rate. Later, in October 2004, the ceiling rate
was relaxed, but the floor on lending rates remains in place. It was not until July 20, 2013,
following further interest rate reform, that the Chinese Central Bank freed up interest rates;
and since then commercial banks have acquired much greater autonomy in setting lending
and deposit rates.
In addition, there was discrimination in bank loans in favour of SOEs relative to private
firms (Cull and Xu, 2003), with state-owned banks often lending to SOEs for political,
employment and taxation purposes rather than for profitability (Brandt and Li, 2003). As
Yeung (2009) discusses, for these banks (the Big Four SOCBs, policy banks, joint stock
8

commercial banks, and city banks), the decision of whether to grant loans was often
determined by unofficial assessment criteria and majority state ownership of financial
systems. SOEs tended to receive loans from the Big Four banks because of their state
ownership, without pledging the necessary collateral; while private firms were expected to
pledge collateral by securing their fixed assets to the equivalent value of the collateral
required. This was a rational decision made by banks to bias their lending against private
firms, based on the higher risks involved and higher costs of transaction and risk evaluation.
Since the economic reform of 1978, the evolution of the private sector in China has been
significant. According to the Bureau of Statistics, up until December 2011 the output of the
private sector accounted for more than 50% of GDP and provided more than 90% of the job
opportunities; but discrimination against lending to private firms in China, as described
above, has limited the growth of bank loans to private firms (Li et al., 2008). Extant literature
investigates the lending practices towards private firms in China, and argues that poor
profitability and higher credit risks among private firms are the main reasons for
discrimination in bank loans and loan standards (Brandt and Li, 2003; Firth et al., 2009).
When making lending decisions, banks are also concerned about borrowers’ governance
structure, as better governance structure is effective in protecting the interests of banks.
Specifically, at the G20/OECD forum on April 10, 2015, Mr Yao Feng, the vice president of
the China Association for Public Companies (CAPCO), emphasized that the governance
structure of listed firms has been improved and is effective in protecting the interests of all
investors 4 . Anecdotal evidence also suggests that loan officers are concerned about the
governance structure of borrowers even after collateral loans are granted5; and that a better
governance structure helps firms to obtain loans with lower collateral requirements6.
2.2 Development of hypotheses
In this section, we discuss how different aspects of corporate governance affect the use of
collateral; and we particularly focus on ownership structure and the two-tier board structure
as proxies for corporate governance.
One feature of ownership structure in China is the existence of a controlling shareholder
through a pyramidal structure. As noted by existing studies, these controlling shareholders
hold significant control rights in excess of cash flow rights; and this divergence between
control rights and cash flow rights induces moral hazards and adverse selection activities by
4

Source access: http://stock.hexun.com/2015-04-15/174961155.html
Source access: http://www.hinews.cn/news/system/2009/02/16/010415723.shtml
6
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controlling shareholders (Cleassens et al., 2002). Controlling shareholders may use their
powerful position to extract resources for their private benefit at the cost of other investors,
while suffering limited consequences for such behaviour; and this incentive to expropriate
other investors becomes more severe when controlling shareholders’ excess control rights
become larger (Lin et al., 2011). This severe expropriation will result in a higher probability
of financial distress or bankruptcy, as well as associated costs; all of which are detrimental to
creditors. As creditors face higher credit risks, and incorporate this expectation into their
lending decisions, they are more likely to use higher requirements as a protection against the
possibility of a borrower defaulting.
Another feature of ownership structure in China is the existence of multiple large
shareholders. Noticing that controlling shareholders have an incentive to practise
expropriation, existing studies have suggested that a structure involving multiple large
shareholders is effective in mitigating such behaviour, because these large shareholders may
compete for control and monitor the controlling shareholders (Bennedsen and Wolfenson,
2000; Laeven and Levine, 2008). An active takeover market does not exist in China; but
other large shareholders, apart from the controlling shareholder, can challenge opportunistic
controlling shareholders. Other large shareholders may constitute a serious obstacle to
expropriation activities by the controlling shareholder because of their desire to protect their
own interests and reduce the probability of financial distress (Berkman et al., 2009;
Huybhebaert and Wang, 2012; Yeh and Woidtke, 2005). In the case of presence of multiple
large shareholders, banks will face lower credit risks and thus require lower collateral.
Furthermore, expropriation by a controlling shareholder is more evident in non-SOEs. In
these firms, the controlling shareholder is usually an individual or a family, who uses the
pyramid structure to enhance their ultimate control and extract resources for their private
benefit, so that the main agency conflicts faced by banks involve the controlling shareholders.
Consequently, banks will require higher collateral for non-SOEs with higher excess control
rights or with lower ownership by multiple large shareholders. However, in the case of SOEs,
Fan et al. (2013) argue that the excess control rights of the government mainly results from
the intention of the government to decentralize decision rights to firm managers, and to
reduce government interference as well as political costs; thus self-dealing behaviour by
managers becomes more severe and banks face agency conflicts with management.
Therefore, the influence of excess control rights and ownership by multiple large
shareholders on the use of collateral is weaker in SOEs. Thus we form the following
hypotheses:
10

H1a: Excess control rights are positively related to the use of collateral, and this positive
relationship is more pronounced in non-SOEs than in SOEs.
H1b: Ownership by multiple large shareholders is negatively related to the use of
collateral, and this negative relationship is more pronounced in non-SOEs than in SOEs.
We next consider the effect of the two-tier board structure. In terms of the board of
directors, board size is one of the factors that affect the effectiveness of the board’s
monitoring function. Compared to small boards, large boards are less effective in
communication and more likely to be controlled by powerful shareholders (Yermack, 1996).
Firth et al. (2007a) also argue that a large board may reduce the informativeness of earnings,
which decreases its ability to monitor the management. In this sense, banks may consider that
firms with larger boards lose their ability to exert efficient monitoring, causing a higher credit
risk, so that creditors are more likely to require them to pledge higher collateral.
In addition, agency theorists consider a board’s independence to be a crucial aspect of its
monitoring role, which serves the best interests of other investors (Fama and Jensen, 1983;
Liu et al., 2015). In the context of China, independent directors are supposed to ensure that
financial decisions are made to maximize firm value and should not result in earnings or cash
flows that are biased toward the controlling shareholders (CSRC, 2002). Independent
directors are thus expected to promote good governance, due to their positive behavioural
motivation and reputation concern (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shan and McIver, 2011; Shan,
2013), and to be effective in mitigating opportunistic behaviour by management (Liu et al.,
2015). Thus, board independence is able to protect firms from financial distress and reduce
the credit risk faced by banks, and in turn reduce the use of collateral.
Existing studies have also documented that separating the positions of CEO and
chairman can increase the effectiveness of the board’s monitoring of management. Liu and
Lu (2007) provide empirical evidence that the effectiveness of board monitoring becomes
weaker when the CEO is also the chairman. Accordingly, if firms have a dual CEO and
chairman, managerial self-dealing behaviour will be more severe, which leads to a higher
probability of financial distress and credit risks, and to the need for firms to pledge more
collateral to obtain loans.
As the characteristics of the board are associated with the monitoring of managerial
behaviour, based on our discussion above about the dominant agency conflicts between SOEs
and non-SOEs, we form the following hypotheses:
H2a: Board size is positively associated with the use of collateral, and this positive
relationship is more pronounced in SOEs than in non-SOEs.
11

H2b: The proportion of independent directors is negatively associated with the use of
collateral, and this negative relationship is more pronounced in SOEs than in non-SOEs.
H2c: Having a dual CEO/chairman is positively associated with the use of collateral,
and this positive relationship is more pronounced in SOEs than in non-SOEs.
The existence of both a board of directors and a supervisory board in China is usually
referred as a two-tier board structure. According to the Company Law (2003), the main
objective of the supervisory board is to examine the financial statements and monitor the
behaviour of executives and directors of boards, which may help to improve the quality of
firms’ accounting. Unlike boards of directors, the supervisory boards represent firm workers
and minority shareholders, who are free of the control of controlling shareholders; and
executives or directors cannot be members of the supervisory boards. In this sense, a larger
supervisory board is more likely to successfully protect the interests of stakeholders, and
these stakeholders value supervisory boards and appreciate their activities. In particular, Firth
et al. (2007a) show that large supervisory boards result in an improvement in the quality of
accounting information. If the large supervisory board of a borrower can effectively exercise
its monitoring role and decrease the credit risks faced by banks, it is then expected to reduce
the use of collateral in their loan contracts.
Furthermore, the professional knowledge and working experience of supervisors in areas
such as law and accounting should be able to improve the governance of a supervisory board.
Dahya et al. (2003) point out that supervisors are expected to have the necessary
competencies in terms of knowledge and experience to perform their monitoring role. If a
supervisory board that has more supervisors with the appropriate professional knowledge or
working experience improves corporate governance, this is expected to reduce credit risk and
to be negatively related to the use of collateral.
As the supervisory board is able to exert monitoring over the management, we expect
that the effect of the characteristics of the supervisory board on the use of collateral will be
more pronounced in SOEs. Therefore, we form the following hypotheses:
H3a: Supervisory board size is negatively associated with the use of collateral, and this
negative relationship is more pronounced in SOEs than in non-SOEs.
H3b: The proportion of supervisors with professional knowledge or working experience
on the supervisory board is negatively associated with the use of collateral, and this negative
relationship is more pronounced in SOEs than in non-SOEs.
3 Data and methodology
3.1 Sample selection
12

The initial sample consists of all firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges
for the years 2007 to 2009. The bank loan sample is manually collected from the footnotes of
the annual reports of listed firms. To be included in the sample, the footnote should contain
detailed information on the bank loans, such as loan maturity (long term or short term), the
type of bank loan (guaranteed, collateralized, or unsecured), and the amount of loans for each
type. The present research also used the annual reports to identify the professional
supervisors. Other corporate financial data used in this research are gathered from the China
Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database.
Initially, there are 4,969 firm-year observations available on the CSMAR database from
2007 to 2009. Table 1 describes the sample selection process. First, 523 observations with no
outstanding loans were eliminated; and of the remaining 4,446 observations, 18 observations
in the financial industry were deleted. Then 109 observations were eliminated because the
type of bank loan cannot be identified in the financial reports; and a further 170 observations
with insufficient data to calculate financial data were also deleted. Moreover, an additional
387 ST or *ST firm-year observations7 were also eliminated, as were 568 observations that
had insufficient data to calculate corporate governance data. The final sample consisted of
3,194 firm-year observations from 2007 to 2009. In addition, as we use the one-year lagged
value of all independent variables for the empirical analysis, we also collected data for these
independent variables for 2006, which includes 3,194 firm-year observations.
Table 1. Sample selection process
Sample selection
Firm-year observations from 2007 to 2009
Less:
Firms without outstanding loans
Firms from financial industry
Type of loan cannot be identified
Firms with missing information
Firms flagged with ST or *ST
Total observations

Observations
4,969
523
18
109
170+568
387
3,194

3.2 Estimation model and variable definition
According to the hypotheses presented in the previous section, this research estimates the
following models for regression analysis:

7

ST stands for Special Treatment, and refers to the listed firms that have already had negative net profits for two
consecutive years. *ST refers to the listed firms that have already had negative net profits for three consecutive
years and thus have the probability of being delisted from the stock exchanges.
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where Collateral is the percentage of total loans collateralized for firm i in year t. In the
empirical analysis, we use the percentage of collateralized loans over total loans outstanding
as a measure for firms’ use of collateral, which is consistent with Chen et al. (2013)8. In
particular, the amount of collateralized loans is the sum of both pledged loans and mortgage
loans, and firms’ use of collateral is defined as follows:
Collateral = Collateralized loans / Total loans outstanding
Governance represents a set of variables that we employ as the proxies for ownership
and governance. To test our main hypotheses, we include each of these variables in equation
(1) separately. In particular, the proxies for ownership include NonSOE, Execss and Top2_10.
NonSOE is a dummy variable equal to 1 for non-SOEs and 0 for SOEs. Consistent with Chen
et al. (2011), a firm is identified as a non-SOE when its controlling shareholder is an
individual or a non-state entity, and other firms are defined as SOEs. Excess is the deviation
between control rights and cash flow rights of the controlling shareholders, consistent with
Claessens et al. (2002). Top2_10 is the percentage of shares held by the second to the tenth
largest shareholders.
We measure the two-tier board structure governance by looking at five aspects: Board is
the log of the total number of directors on the board; Indep is the ratio of independent
directors to the total number of directors on the board; Duality is a dummy variable equal to 1
if the CEO is also the chairman and 0 otherwise; SBsize is the log of the number of
supervisors on the supervisory board; SBexpert is the ratio of supervisors on the supervisory
board with professional knowledge or work experience in areas such as law and accounting.
In line with existing studies (Menkhoff et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2013), a set of control
variables, as well as year and industry fixed effects, are also included in the regression; and
the detailed information and definitions of all variables used in this study are presented in
Table 2 below.
Table 2. Variable definition
Variable
Collateral
NonSOE

Definition
The percentage of total loans that are collateralized
A dummy variable equal to 1 for non-SOEs and 0 otherwise.

8

As argued by Chen et al. (2013), the ideal proxy for the use of collateral is to incorporate the information on
collateral value. However, due to the unavailability of this information, we follow Chen et al. (2013) and use the
collateral loan ratio as the proxy in this study.
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Excess
Top2_10
Board size (Board)
Independence (Indep)
Duality
SB size
SB expertise

Ownership
Guarantee
Firm size (Size)
Abnormal earnings (AE)
B/M
Return on assets (ROA)
Leverage
LDebt
Tangibility
Liquidity
Age
Sales
Segment

Control-ownership deviation by the controlling shareholder
The sum of ownership held by the second to the 10th largest shareholders
Log of the total number of directors on the board
The percentage of independent directors on the board
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman of the board
Log of the total number of members on the supervisory board
The percentage of supervisors on the supervisory board who have
professional knowledge or work experience in areas such as law and
accounting
Ownership held by the largest shareholder
Percentage of total loans that are guaranteed
Log of firm total assets
Earnings per share in year t+1 minus earnings per share in year t, divided by
the share price in year t
Book to market value
Net income / Total assets
Total debts / Total assets
Long-term debt / Total loans
Fixed assets / Total assets
Cash and cash equivalents / Total assets
The log of the years since firm is established
Total sales / Total assets
The number of business segments

3.3 Estimation methods
In the empirical analysis, one concern about our estimation on the relationship between
corporate governance, ownership structure, and the use of collateral, is the issue of
endogeneity. For example, firms required by banks to provide higher collateral may have the
incentive to adjust their ownership structure or board structure, suggesting the existence of
reverse causality. To address this issue, we use a simultaneous equation system in which the
use of collateral, ownership structure, and board structures are endogenously determined. In
addition, since firm profitability and guaranteed loans can also be endogenously determined
by a set of control variables similar to that used in the collateral equation, we further include
two equations in our simultaneous equation system where firm profitability and guaranteed
loans are used as dependent variables. In particular, these equations are expressed as follows:

Board it   0  1Collateral it   2 Excess it 1   3Top2_10it 1   4 NonSOEit 1
  5 Indepit 1   6 Duality it 1   7 SBsizeit 1   8 SBexpert it 1

(2)

  9 AEit 1  10 Sizeit 1  11Segment it  Year  Industry   it
Indepit   0  1Collateral it   2 Excess it 1   3Top2_10it 1   4 NonSOEit 1
  5 Board it 1   6 Duality it 1   7 SBsizeit 1   8 SBexpert it 1

(3)

  9Ownershipit  10 Sizeit 1  11 Ageit  Year  Industry   it
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Excess it   0  1Collateral it   2 Board it 1   3Top2_10it 1   4 NonSOEit 1
  5 Indepit 1   6 Duality it 1   7 SBsizeit 1   8 SBexpert it 1
  9Tangibilit yit 1  10 Sizeit 1  11LTDebtit 1  12 Excessmeanit

(4)

 Year  Industry   it

Top2_10it   0  1Collateral it   2 Excess it 1   3 Board it 1   4 NonSOEit 1
  5 Indepit 1   6 Duality it 1   7 SBsizeit 1   8 SBexpert it 1   9 B / M it 1
 10 SHSEit 1  11Sizeit 1  12 Leverageit 1  13Topmeanit

(5)

 Year  Industry   it
Guaranteeit   0  1Collateral it   2 Excess it 1   3Top2_10it 1   4 NonSOEit 1
  5 Indepit 1   6 Duality it 1   7 SBsizeit 1   8 SBexpert it 1
  9 Ownershipit  10 Sizeit 1  11Leverageit 1  12Tangibilit yit 1

(6)

 13 LagGuaranteeit  Year  Industry   it
ROAit   0  1Collateral it   2 Excess it 1   3Top2_10it 1   4 NonSOEit 1
  5 Indepit 1   6 Duality it 1   7 SBsizeit 1   8 SBexpert it 1   9Ownershipit

(7)

 10 Sizeit 1  11Sales it 1  12 LagROAit  Year  Industry   it
In each of the above equations, other endogenous variables are included as independent
variables to account for reverse causality. Following the discussion by Bhagat and Bolton
(2008), instrument variables for each endogenous variable are also included in the equations.
Specifically: Segment, defined as the number of business segments, is used as the instrument
variable in equation (2); Age, defined as the log of years since firm was established, is used as
the instrument variable in equation (3); Excessmean, defined as the industry average Excess,
is used as the instrument variable in equation (4); Topmean, defined as the industry average
Top2_10, is used as the instrument variable in equation (5); LagGuarantee, defined as the
lagged guaranteed loan, is used as the instrument variable in equation (6); and LagROA,
defined as the lagged ROA, is used as the instrument variable in equation (7). The selection of
these instrument variables is motivated by existing empirical studies (Linck et al., 2008;
Jackling and Johl, 2009; Lin et al., 2011). In the next section, where we conduct the
regression analysis to examine the effects of corporate governance on the use of collateral,
the simultaneous equation systems include the equations where the use of collateral and the
relevant corporate governance variables are treated endogenously. These simultaneous
equation systems are estimated using the three-stage least square (3SLS) method, which takes
the cross-equation error correlation into account to improve the estimation efficiency of a
large sample. We also conduct over-identification tests (reporting p-values) to examine the
validity of the instrument variables.
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Moreover, borrowers with a certain ownership structure and board structure might have
other firm-specific characteristics, unaccounted for in our model, that affect ownership
structure, board structure and the use of collateral jointly, and may bias our results. Although
it is difficult to rule out the endogeneity issue completely, we address this issue in two ways,
by estimating equation (1) using both the firm fixed effect model and system GMM. In
particular, the firm fixed effect/GMM allows us to account for time-invariant, common
unobservable or omitted firm-specific characteristics that might affect ownership structure,
board structure, and the use of collateral.
To save space and focus on our main discussion, we report only the estimation results of
equation (1) of our simultaneous equation system; and estimation results of other equations
are available upon request9. We also report the estimation results of equation (1) using the
firm fixed effect and system GMM for robustness.
3.4 Summary statistics
Table 3 lists the summary statistics of variables for the full sample. Panel A presents
descriptive statistics on the use of collateral; Panels B and C show the characteristics of
ownership structure and corporate governance proxies; and Panel D presents the summary
statistics of control variables to be used in the regression analysis. Panel A shows that, on
average, about 36% of total loans require collateral. As Panel B shows, non-SOEs comprise
44.3% of the sample. In addition, Panel B shows that the average excess control right is
6.2%, and that other large shareholders are holding 19.2% of ownership. Panel C shows that
the average board size was 9.2 and the median was 9; while the proportion of independent
directors on the board has a mean of 38.3%; and about 15.9% of the CEOs were also the
chairman of the board. Panel C also shows that the average (median) of supervisory board
size is 3.9 (3), and that the proportion of supervisors on the supervisory board with
professional knowledge or work experience has a mean of 20.0%.
Table 3. Summary statistics
Variables
N
Panel A: Collateral loan ratio
Collateral
3194
Panel B: Ownership structure
NonSOE
3194
Excess
3194
Top2_10
3194
Panel C: Corporate governance
Board
3194

Mean

Median

5th

95th

Std. Dev.

36.0%

27.1%

0

1

34.2%

44.3%
6.2%
19.2%

0
0
17.0%

0
0
2.5%

1
23.1%
43.4%

50.3%
8.6%
13.0%

9.2

9

6

13

1.9

9

For readers’ reference, we present the estimation results of other equations in the Appendix. These equations
correspond to the collateral equation in column 6 of Table 6, where we consider all endogenous variables.
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Indep
Duality
SB size
SB expertise
Panel D: Control variables
Ownership
Guarantee
Size
AE
B/M
ROA
Leverage
LDebt
Tangibility
Liquidity

3194
3194
3194
3194

38.3%
15.9%
3.9
20.0%

33.3%
0
3
20.0%

33.3%
0
3
0

55.6%
1
6
66.7%

9.4%
36.6%
1.3
21.4%

3194
3194
3194
3194
3194
3194
3194
3194
3194
3194

35.53%
39.7%
21.6
0.3%
53.0%
3.4%
24.0%
30.3%
27.8%
16.7%

33.48%
35.8%
21.5
0
48.2%
3.5%
23.2%
20.2%
24.8%
13.7%

13.93%
0
20.1
-5.2%
18.0%
-6.4%
2.3%
0
1.9%
2.9%

62.38%
1
23.5
7.5%
102.9%
12.4%
48.7%
96.5%
61.8%
40.0%

15.22%
33.8%
1.1
6.6%
26.2%
8.7%
14.4%
31.7%
18.5%
12.3%

4 Empirical results
4.1 Univariate tests
To provide some preliminary information, Table 4 presents univariate comparisons of the
collateralized loan ratio as well as of ownership and governance characteristics of SOEs and
non-SOEs. Firstly, the average collateralized loan ratio is 28.7% for SOEs, which is
significantly lower than the 45.1% for non-SOEs. In addition, the excess control rights of the
controlling shareholder in non-SOEs are significantly higher than in SOEs. The results also
clearly suggest that non-SOEs have more concentrated ownership by other large
shareholders, with an average of 22.9%, while the average is 16.3% for SOEs. In terms of a
two-tier board structure, the average board size in firms controlled by SOEs is 9.6, which is
significantly larger than the 8.8 for non-SOEs. Table 4 also shows that the SOEs are less
likely to have a dual CEO/chairman, with an average of 10.5%, while the average for nonSOEs was 22.8%. In addition, SOEs have a similar proportion of independent directors to
non-SOEs, with means of 38.1% and 38.5%, respectively. In terms of a supervisory board,
the non-SOEs have a significantly smaller supervisory board, with a size of 3.6 persons,
while SOEs have a typical size of 4.3 persons on average. In addition, non-SOEs have a
smaller proportion of supervisors with professional knowledge or work experience on the
supervisory board than do SOEs, with an average of 17.3% and 22.2%, respectively.
Overall, this section finds that the governance characteristics differed across firms
classified by types of controlling shareholders. Thus, in the following empirical analysis, we
are also interested in examining the effects of ownership structure and corporate governance
on the use of collateral in SOEs and non-SOEs.
Table 4. Univariate tests between SOEs and non-SOEs
Variables
SOEs
Non-SOEs

Difference (t-test)
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Collateral
28.7%
Excess
3.7%
Top2_10
16.3%
Board size
9.6
Independence
38.1%
Duality
10.5%
SB size
4.3
SB expertise
22.2%
*** indicates significance at the 1% level.

45.1%
9.3%
22.9%
8.8
38.5%
22.8%
3.6
17.3%

16.37%***(13.68)
5.62%***(9.10)
6.6%***(14.66)
-0.8***(-12.30)
0.4%(1.31)
-12.3%***(9.27)
-0.7***(-15.37)
-4.9%***(-6.48)

4.2 Multivariate tests
4.2.1 Ownership governance and the use of collateral
Before running the regressions, the correlation matrix and the variance inflation factor (VIF)
are checked; and this shows that absolute values of all the correlation coefficients are less
than 0.397 and the VIF is less than 2.57 for all the regressions (untabulated), which implies
that multi-collineality would not be a critical issue here.
Table 5 provides the empirical results of the collateral equation from our simultaneous
equation system on the association between ownership and the use of collateral. In columns 1
and 2, we consider the influence of Excess and Top2_10 separately. The results in column 1
show that the estimated coefficient of Excess is 0.10, which is statistically significant at the
5% level (t-value is 2.04). We also observe that the coefficient of Excess*NonSOE is positive
and statistically significant at the 5% level (t-value is 2.08). These results support our
hypothesis H1a, that the larger control-ownership wedge of the controlling shareholders is
expected to be associated with a higher risk of expropriation and higher collateral
requirements by banks; and that this effect is more pronounced in non-SOEs. In addition,
higher concentration of ownership held by other large shareholders is able to reduce the risk
of expropriation and thus reduce the use of collateral in their loan contracts.
In column 2 we consider the effect of ownership concentration held by other large
shareholders on the use of collateral. Specifically, we find that the estimated coefficients of
Top2_10 and Top2_10*NonSOE are -0.50 and -0.28, with both significant at the 1% levels (tvalues are -6.76 and -2.86, respectively).These results are consistent with our expectation and
support our hypothesis H1b, that ownership by other large shareholders will mitigate the risk
of expropriation and lead to lower collateral requirements; and that this mitigating effect is
more significant in non-SOEs. In the last column, we put both variables together, and the
estimated results are quite similar to those reported in both columns 1 and 2.
We also observe that the estimated coefficient of NonSOE in column 1 is 0.16,
significant at the 1% level, indicating that the use of collateral is significantly higher for non-
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SOEs than for SOEs. This result is consistent with An et al. (2014). The estimated
coefficients of some control variables exhibit the expected signs. For example, there is a
negative association between the guarantee requirements (Guarantee) and the use of
collateral; which suggests that a loan guarantee acts like a collateral substitute and allows a
lender to enforce collateral-free loans. The likelihood of using collateral also decreases with
the size of the borrower (Size), firm profitability (ROA), tangibility (Tangibility), and
liquidity (Liquidity); which is consistent with Almeida and Campello (2007). In addition, the
leverage levels (Leverage) and term structure (LDebt) are both positively related to the use of
collateral. The present research finds no strong support for the signalling hypothesis, because
the relevant variable (AE) shows a negative sign, which is different from Barclay and Smith
(1995). This research also does not find a postulated positive relationship between growth
opportunities (B/M) and the proportion of secured debt. Given an inverse relationship
between growth opportunities and indebtedness in the Chinese context (Bhabra et al., 2008),
an inverse relationship between the former and the secured debt ratio may be interpreted as a
general tendency for growing firms to decrease the size of debt financing, especially
collateralized loans.
Table 5. Effect of ownership on the use of collateral
Dependent variable
Collateralized loan ratio
1
2
3
Excess
0.10**(2.04)
0.08*(1.83)
Excess*NonSOE
0.15**(2.08)
0.03**(2.18)
Top2_10
-0.50***(-6.76)
-0.22***(-2.88)
Top2_10*NonSOE
-0.28***(-2.86)
-0.30***(-3.01)
NonSOE
0.16***(9.50)
0.23***(9.96)
0.24***(8.66)
Ownership
-0.18***(-4.11)
-0.28***(-6.12)
-0.27***(-5.88)
Guarantee
-0.67***(-33.69)
-0.67***(-34.38)
-0.67***(-34.13)
Size
-0.09***(-11.62)
-0.09***(-11.77)
-0.09***(-11.74)
AE
-0.36***(-3.59)
-0.33***(-3.29)
-0.33***(-3.30)
B/M
0.10***(3.70)
0.08***(3.04)
0.08***(3.04)
ROA
-0.64***(-6.19)
-0.53***(-5.23)
-0.53***(-5.20)
Leverage
0.32***(6.50)
0.32***(6.39)
0.32***(6.41)
LDebt
0.26***(11.90)
0.26***(12.20)
0.26***(12.21)
Tangibility
-0.42***(-11.29)
-0.40***(-10.81)
-0.40***(-10.77)
Liquidity
-0.18***(-3.09)
-0.09(-1.52)
-0.09(-1.49)
Constant
2.53***(17.15)
2.68***(18.02)
2.45***(16.24)
Industry fixed effects
Included
Included
Included
Year fixed effects
Included
Included
Included
Adjusted R2
0.35
0.36
0.36
Observations
3194
3194
3194
T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the standard error with small-sample correction.
*, **and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

4.2.2 Two-tier board structure and the use of collateral
Table 6 provides the results of the collateral equation from our simultaneous equation system
on the association between a two-tier board structure and the use of collateral. In first three
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columns, we examine the effect of proxies for the board of directors on the use of collateral.
In particular, the estimated coefficients of Board and Duality are positive and statistically
significant (t-values are 2.34 and 2.77, respectively), and significantly negative for Indep (tvalue is -2.05). The positive signs on Board and Duality indicate that firms with a larger
board or dual CEO/chairman are more likely to pledge collateral in their loan contracts; while
the negative sign on Indep indicates that firms with more independent directors are less likely
to use collateral. We also observe that the estimated coefficients of Board*NonSOE and
Duality*NonSOE are negative, and those for Indep*NonSOE are positive. These results
support hypotheses H2a, H2b, and H2c, and are consistent with our arguments that larger
boards and dual CEO/chairman are associated with lower monitoring effectiveness of boards
of directors, and that independent directors are able to exert an autonomous monitoring
function and improve the corporate governance of firms; and that these effects are more
pronounced in SOEs. Thus, banks are likely to reward borrowers with better governance by
lowering collateral requirements. The result regarding the role of independent directors also
corroborates the recent evidence provided by Liu et al. (2015), that board independence can
improve firm performance in Chinese SOEs through effective monitoring.
Table 6. Effect of two-tier board structure on the use of collateral
Dependent variable
Collateralized loan ratio
1
2
3
4
5
Board
0.06**
(2.34)
Board*NonSOE
-0.05***
(-2.74)
Indep
-0.09**
(-2.05)
Indep*NonSOE
0.06*
(1.89)
Duality
0.07***
(2.77)
Duality*NonSOE
-0.06*
(-1.75)
SB size
-0.15**
(-2.45)
SB size*NonSOE
0.02*
(1.67)
SB expert
-0.03*
(-1.82)
SB expert*NonSOE
-0.07**
(-2.25)
NonSOE
0.23***
0.14***
0.19***
0.10**
0.19***
(3.60)
(2.92)
(12.03)
(2.51)
(10.54)
Excess
0.07***
0.05**
0.06***
0.06***
0.06**
(2.86)
(2.60)
(2.74)
(2.76)
(2.75)
Top2_10
-0.37***
-0.35***
-0.36***
-0.35***
-0.36***
(-6.67)
(-6.40)
(-6.57)
(-6.40)
(-6.58)
Ownership
-0.28***
-0.28**
-0.28***
-0.28***
-0.28***
(-6.13)
(-6.03)
(-6.13)
(-6.13)
(-6.27)

6
0.09**
(2.16)
-0.08**
(-2.26)
-0.09**
(-1.97)
0.07**
(2.06)
0.07***
(2.67)
-0.06*
(-1.71)
-0.10***
(-2.74)
0.02*
(1.82)
-0.01**
(-2.37)
-0.09**
(-2.50)
0.15*
(1.88)
0.06**
(2.79)
-0.36***
(-6.40)
-0.27***
(-5.84)
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Guarantee

-0.67***
-0.67***
-0.67***
-0.68***
-0.67***
(-34.21)
(-34.28)
(-34.27)
(-34.30)
(-34.22)
Size
-0.09***
-0.08***
-0.08***
0.08***
-0.08***
(-11.52)
(-11.34)
(-11.45)
(-11.21)
(-11.38)
AE
-0.34***
-0.33***
-0.33***
-0.34***
-0.33***
(-3.35)
(-3.29)
(-3.30)
(-3.38)
(-3.30)
B/M
0.08***
0.08***
0.08***
0.08***
0.08***
(3.00)
(2.95)
(3.08)
(2.87)
(2.97)
ROA
-0.55***
-0.53***
-0.55***
-0.55***
-0.55***
(-5.30)
(-5.12)
(-5.25)
(-5.32)
(-5.25)
Lev
0.31***
0.32***
0.32***
0.32***
0.31***
(6.32)
(6.39)
(6.45)
(6.49)
(6.37)
Ldebt
0.27***
0.27***
0.27***
0.27***
0.27***
(12.32)
(12.42)
(12.48)
(12.38)
(12.43)
Tangibility
-0.40***
-0.40***
-0.39***
-0.39***
-0.40***
(-10.81)
(-10.79)
(-10.72)
(-10.57)
(-10.82)
Liquidity
-0.11*
-0.11*
-0.10*
-0.11*
-0.11*
(-1.90)
(-1.81)
(-1.77)
(-1.81)
(-1.90)
Constant
2.64***
2.61***
2.59***
2.56***
2.62***
(17.26)
(17.35)
(17.62)
(17.02)
(17.76)
Industry fixed effects Included
Included
Included
Included
Included
Year fixed effects
Included
Included
Included
Included
Included
Adjusted R2
0.36
0.36
0.36
0.36
0.36
Observations
3194
3194
3194
3194
3194
T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the standard error with small-sample correction.
*, **and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

-0.67***
(-34.26)
-0.08***
(-11.16)
-0.33***
(-3.26)
0.08***
(2.90)
-0.52***
(-5.09)
0.33***
(6.64)
0.27***
(12.49)
-0.40***
(-10.83)
-0.11*
(-1.87)
2.44***
(16.01)
Included
Included
0.37
3194

Columns 4 and 5 examine the relationship between the structure of a supervisory board
and the use of collateral. From these two columns, we observe that the estimated coefficients
of both SB size and SB expert are negative and significant at the 10% or 5% levels (t-values
are -2.45 and -1.82), respectively. These coefficients indicate that a larger supervisory board
and its combined expertise can reduce the use of collateral in loan contracts by Chinese listed
firms, which is partially consistent with hypotheses H3a and H3b. These results are consistent
with the argument by Firth et al. (2007a) that larger supervisory boards with professional
knowledge are effective in monitoring executives and directors, and therefore improve
corporate governance. In columns 4 and 5, we also observe that the estimated coefficients of
SB size*NonSOE and SB expert*NonSOE are positive and negative, respectively, suggesting
that the effect of supervisory board is more pronounced in SOEs, while the effect of
supervisory board expertise is more pronounced in non-SOEs.
Although this is inconsistent with our hypothesis H3b, it could be consistent with the
situation in China: The proposed explanation could be that, in China, non-SOEs usually face
discrimination in accessing bank loans from state-owned banks (Cull and Xu, 2003; Li et al.,
2008), and so a professional supervisory board may help non-SOEs to improve accounting
quality and alleviate the credit concern of banks, thus reducing the collateral requirements.
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The results in the last column, where we consider all variables together, are quantitatively
similar to those reported in columns 1 to 5.
The overall results from Tables 5 and 6 demonstrate our main findings, that the
monitoring effectiveness of ownership and a two-tier board structure varies between SOEs
and non-SOEs, which can be attributed to different dominant agency problems in these firms.
Specifically, in SOEs, the controlling shareholder is the government, which is not a real
person, resulting in an ambiguous identification of ultimate property rights; and managers are
only the agents, so principal-manager conflicts of interest dominate in SOEs (Fan et al.,
2013). Moreover, as the central government has decentralized decision rights and reduced
government interference, the government’s power to appoint or vote for directors for SOEs
has diminished; and both boards of directors and supervisory boards have started to function
properly to constrain managerial self-dealing, which may well reduce credit risks and the use
of collateral. However, in non-SOEs, the controlling shareholders hold substantial controlling
positions in management, so that controlling-minority shareholder conflicts of interest
dominate in non-SOEs. As controlling shareholders still control the appointment of boards of
directors and supervisory boards (Chen et al., 2006), monitoring by other block shareholders
will be effective in reducing expropriation by controlling shareholders, and their influence
becomes more significant for non-SOEs relative to SOEs.
5 Additional tests
5.1 Identity of controlling shareholders and the use of collateral
The previous sections differentiate firms as either SOEs or non-SOEs; and this may raise
additional concerns about the identity of controlling shareholders for both SOEs and nonSOEs. On the one hand, the controlling shareholder of SOEs can be either the central
government or local governments, which have different objectives. Specifically, central SOEs
aim to maintain control over key industries and guarantee the safety of the national economy,
while local SOEs aim to increase local GDP and reduce local unemployment (Jin et al.,
2005). Chen et al. (2009) also argue that central SOEs are subject to stricter monitoring from
the government compared with local SOEs. To examine the use of collateral between these
two types of firms empirically, we include a dummy variable SOECG, which equals 1 for
central SOEs and 0 for local SOEs, into the collateral equation; and estimate equations using
the SOE subsample only. The results are reported in column 1 of Table 7.
On the other hand, for non-SOEs, the incentive of controlling shareholders to expropriate
other investors may vary across different types of large owners (Lin et al., 2011). Firstly,
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within the sample of our non-SOEs, there are 4% (57) firm-year observations that are widely
held ownership firms. As no shareholder holds controlling positions, the incentive for
expropriation in these firms may be weak, compared with the incentive for controlling
shareholders. We thus re-estimate our baseline model by including a controlling shareholder
identity dummy (Controlling). Secondly, for non-SOEs, the controlling shareholders can be
divided into the following groups: family or individuals; financial institutions; and collective
control. If the controlling shareholder is a financial institution or a collective, the private
benefits of control are diluted among many independent owners; and as a result the
controlling shareholder’s incentive for tunnelling may be weak. If the controlling shareholder
is an individual or a family, they could have a stronger incentive for expropriation, as the
dilution of private benefits is not a problem (Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Ellul et al., 2007).
Thus, we examine whether the use of collateral is even higher for particular types of
controlling shareholders of non-SOEs. Empirically, we include controlling shareholder type
identity (Family, Collective, Financial) into our baseline model, and run the regressions for
the non-SOE subsamples and report the results in the last two columns of Table 7 (we only
report the key variables that are of interest to us).
Table 7. Controlling shareholder identity and the use of collateral
Dependent variable
Collateralized loan ratio
1.SOE subsample
2.Non-SOE subsample
3.Non-SOE subsample
SOECG
-0.04***(-2.74)
Controlling
0.04***(2.95)
Family
0.05**(2.09)
Collective
0.03(1.13)
Financial
0.01(0.38)
Control variables include all corporate governance related variables and the other control variables that we used
in previous tables
Adjusted R2
0.30
0.36
0.37
Observations
1778
1416
1416
T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the standard error with small-sample correction.
*, **and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

As can be seen in the first column, the coefficient of SOECG is -0.04 and significant at
the 1% level (t-value is -2.74). This result indicates that central SOEs place less collateral in
their loan contracts compared with local SOEs. As can be seen in the last two columns, the
estimated coefficient of Controlling is 0.04 and significant at the 1% level (t-value is 2.95),
indicating that, compared with widely held firms, the presence of controlling shareholders is
associated with higher use of collateral. In the last column, we find that the estimated
coefficient of Family is significantly positive, while the coefficients of both Collective and
Financial are insignificant. These results imply that, among different types of non-SOE
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owners, family (individual)-controlled firms are more likely to be required to pledge
collateral compared with other types of firms.
5.2 Robustness check
Though we have addressed the issue of reverse causality using the simultaneous equation
system, we may still face the issue of endogeneity due to unobserved time-invariant
characteristics. To further address this issue and check the robustness of our main results, we
estimate the collateral equation, which includes all of our key variables together, using the
firm fixed effect model and system GMM; and report the results in Table 8. As can be seen,
the results are broadly consistent with our results from previous tables. Specifically, for
system GMM estimation, we also conduct the Hansen over-identification test and report the
J-statistics (p-value). The J-statistics follow the Chi-square (2) distribution under the null
hypothesis that the instruments we use are exogenous. Table 8 shows that the p-value is 0.57
larger than 0.1, indicating that we cannot reject the null hypothesis. Moreover, AR(1) and
AR(2) tests suggest that residuals are correlated in the first differences, but are not correlated
in the second differences. These tests indicate the validity of our system GMM estimation.
These results further confirm the findings from the preceding regression analyses.
In addition, we also notice that our main results may suffer the issue of selection bias,
because it can be argued that the results that SOEs have a lower collateralized loan ratio
could be due to the fact that banks are inclined to lend to SOEs so that SOEs receive more
bank loans. Though we have presented consistent and robust results with alternative
specifications that can address endogeneity to a large extent, we offer the caveat that we are
not able to rule out the endogeneity issue completely, and thus caution should be exercised
when interpreting our results.
Table 8. Effect of ownership structure and corporate governance on the use of collateral: Firm fixedeffects and System GMM
1.Firm fixed-effects
2.System GMM
Board
0.09**(2.30)
0.16**(2.07)
Indep
-0.02(-0.57)
-0.23***(-5.10)
Duality
0.08**(2.43)
0.03(1.22)
SB size
-0.07**(-2.09)
-0.03**(-2.16)
SB expertise
-0.06*(-1.73)
-0.04*(-1.91)
NonSOE
0.02(0.45)
0.06(0.17)
Top2_10
-0.19**(-2.27)
-0.47***(-4.09)
Excess
0.02*(1.74)
0.01***(7.13)
Hansen test (p-value)
0.57
AR (1) (p-value)
0.00
AR (2) (p-value)
0.47
Adjusted R2
0.12
Observations
3194
2052
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Note: all control variables are also included in both regressions, and the lagged dependent variable is also
included in the system GMM regression.
In the fixed-effect regression, t-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the robust standard error, clustered
by the firm. In the system GMM regressions, t-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the two-step robust,
firm-clustered standard errors with small-sample correction.
*, **and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

5.3 Alternative measurements and additional concern
Our next test relates to alternative measurements. Larger firms may have more directors on
boards and supervisory boards; and thus we apply two alternative variables in the regression
for a robustness check. In particular, the new variables are defined as the ratio of the log of
board size and supervisory board size to the log of total firm assets. We also redefine our
Excess and Top2_10 variables, and create two new variables, Excess_dummy and
Top2_10_dummy, which are dummy variables, equal to 1 if a firm has a control-ownership
wedge or other large shareholders, and 0 otherwise. The results in column 1 of Table 9 show
that using these alternative variables does not change the quality of the findings or the
explanatory power of the model. In the untabulated analysis, we also use a Herfindahl index
(HERF) of the second to the tenth largest shareholdings to capture the internal governance of
other large shareholders. HERF is defined as the sum of the squares of the proportional
shareholdings of the second to the tenth largest shareholders in the company; and the results
remain unchanged. We also reclassify the variable Duality, by including those CEOs who are
also vice-chairman or director. This alternative definition of duality yields similar results to
those already reported when using the original definition.
Table 9. Alternative measures
1.Alternative variables
2.Ordered logit model
Board a
0.12**(2.50)
0.02**(2.44)
Indep
-0.07*(-1.91)
-0.19**(-2.10)
Duality
0.04**(2.05)
0.07*(1.69)
SB size a
-0.22*(-1.95)
-0.03**(-2.55)
SB expertise
-0.06**(-2.11)
-0.10**(-2.38)
NonSOE
0.17***(11.09)
0.40***(10.73)
Excess_dummy
0.02**(2.37)
0.10**(2.06)
Top2_10_dummy
-0.07***(-5.19)
-0.16***(-4.60)
Control variables include cash flow rights, guarantee, firm size, AE, B/M, ROA, Leverage, LDebt, Tangibility,
Liquidity, industry and year fixed effects
Adjusted R2
0.37
0.37
Observations
3194
3194
a
These variables are redefined in this regression analysis. In particular, Board is defined as the ratio of the log
of the total number of directors on the board to the log of firm total assets; SB size is defined as the ratio of the
log of the total number of directors on the supervisory board to the log of firm total assets; Excess_dummy is
defined as a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the firm has a control-ownership wedge and 0 otherwise; and
Top2_10_dummy is defined as a dummy variable if the firm has other large shareholders and 0 otherwise.
T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the standard error with small-sample correction.
*, **and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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We also use an alternative measure for collateral and construct ranks for the use of
collateral, which can be based on 25 percentiles of the collateral variable. Hence, the
continuous measure of the collateralized loan ratio is transformed into an ordinal variable
with four ranks. To analyse a ranked dependent variable, we apply the Ordered Logit
approach. Column 2 shows the result of the Ordered Logit models. The regression results are
similar to those reported in previous tables, which suggests that the results are robust for the
alternative specification.
Existing studies have also pointed out that board size and ownership structure exhibit a
non-linear relationship with firm value and earnings management (Yermack, 1996; Ding et
al., 2007); and thus board size and ownership by other large shareholders may demonstrate a
non-linear shape with the use of collateral. In order to verify this concern, we have reestimated our main regression by including square terms of ownership structure and board
size attributes separately. From the results (unreported here), we find that the estimated
coefficients on the square terms are all insignificant, indicating that there does not exist any
significant non-linear relationship between corporate governance, ownership, and the use of
collateral.
5.4 Corporate governance, related party transaction, and credit risks
In the previous section, we found corporate governance to be an important determinant of the
use of collateral. Our main conjecture is that good corporate governance is effective in
alleviating expropriation by controlling shareholders and reducing firm credit risks, and in
turn reduces collateral requirements by banks. However, although we have used excess
control rights as the proxy for expropriation in the previous section and investigated its
influence on the use of collateral, we have not provided any direct evidence relating to the
above relationship between corporate governance and expropriation. Therefore, in this
section, we present the results of more direct tests of these predictions by estimating the
effects of corporate governance on more direct measures of expropriation. The first measure
of expropriation is intercorporate loans (also called funds occupation), which is a primary
tool used by controlling shareholders for tunnelling. Following Jiang et al. (2010), other
receivables to total assets (ORECTA) are used to measure intercorporate loans to controlling
shareholders.
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In China, listed firms are required to disclose the amount of transactions between related
parties in their financial statements10. Following Cheung et al. (2006), Jian and Wong (2010)
and Huyghebaert and Wang (2012), we also choose to use the related party transactions
(RPTs) as an alternative measure for expropriation by controlling shareholders.
In the first column of Table 10, whether better corporate governance helps a firm prevent
tunnelling is tested by using the other receivables deflated by total assets (ORECTA) as the
dependent variable to measure tunnelling. The first regression shows that these variables of
governance show expected coefficients similar to those reported previously, indicating that
good governance indeed prevents tunnelling. For example, the estimated coefficient of Board
is 0.003, significant at the 10% level (t-value is 1.83), indicating that larger board size is less
effective in constraining expropriation by controlling shareholders. We also observe that
other corporate governance variables influence expropriation, consistent with their effects on
the use of collateral in previous tables (except that the effect of Duality becomes
insignificant). This finding, that governance helps a firm to prevent tunnelling through
intercorporate loans, may partially explain why such governance affords firms certain
advantages in reducing the use of collateral.
Table 10. Corporate governance, related party transaction and credit risks
Dependent variable
1.ORECTA
2.RPTs
3.ST status
Board
0.003*(1.83)
0.01**(2.32)
0.02**(2.32)
Indep
-0.003**(-2.01)
-0.02**(-2.07)
-0.02(-1.60)
Duality
0.006(0.38)
0.09**(2.56)
0.01**(1.99)
SB size
-0.010**(-2.15)
-0.01(-1.30)
-0.03*(-1.93)
SB expertise
-0.002*(-1.74)
-0.02*(-1.83)
-0.02**(-2.42)
NonSOE
0.002(1.20)
0.02(1.28)
0.09*(1.88)
Excess
0.09**(2.03)
0.03***(4.55)
0.01***(4.59)
Top2_10
0.03(0.18)
-0.23***(-4.33)
-0.17***(-8.91)
Control variables from equation (1) are also included in each regression.
Adjusted R2/Pseudo R2
0.08
0.10
0.05
Observations
3194
3194
3194
T-statistics/Z-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the standard error with small-sample correction.
*, **and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Column 2 reports the empirical findings where related party transactions are employed as
the dependent variables. Overall, the main findings are largely consistent with previous
results that good corporate governance is able to mitigate the incentives for expropriation by
controlling shareholders. For example, we observe that board size is positively related to
RPTs, indicating that expropriation could be mitigated by reducing the board size.

10

Detailed disclosures are required within two working days after signing the contract if, for one party, the total amount of transactions
between related parties is larger than 1,000,000 Renminbi (RMB) or 0.5 per cent of audited net assets, whichever is higher. Moreover, these
dealings have to be approved by the general meeting of shareholders as soon as their size exceeds 10,000,000 RMB or 5% of audited net
assets.

28

Column 3 reports the empirical results regarding the connection between corporate
governance and credit risks. Perhaps the ideal proxy for credit risks is the credit ratings of the
bonds issued. However, we only have limited information on credit ratings of the bonds
issued by our sample firms. Instead, we use the probability of being flagged with ST (ST*) in
subsequent years as the approximate proxy for credit risks 11 , following Qian and Yeung
(2015). The signs of our key variables are consistent with those reported in previous tables,
indicating that better corporate governance is able to reduce the credit risks.
6 Conclusions
Using a sample of China’s listed firms between 2007 and 2009, we investigated the effect of
ownership and corporate governance on the firms’ use of collateral in their loan contracts.
We find that the use of collateral is higher for firms in which controlling shareholders have
larger excess control rights or a lower proportion of ownership held by other large
shareholders; which is more amplified in non-SOEs. Further analysis shows that governance
by two-tier boards also matters for firms’ use of collateral. In particular, we find that the use
of collateral is higher for firms with larger board size, fewer independent directors, duality of
CEO and chairman, and smaller supervisory board size; and that this is more pronounced in
SOEs. In addition, the benefits of employing professional experts on the supervisory board
are more significant for non-SOEs. Our results are robust to endogeneity using different
estimation methods, including the simultaneous equation system, firm fixed effect model, and
system GMM. Nevertheless, we raise the caveat that we cannot rule out endogeneity
completely. Overall, these results suggest that the effectiveness of corporate governance on
reducing the use of collateral depends on the type of controlling shareholders, as well as the
dominating agency problem.
From the perspective of policy makers, the results suggest that listed firms should
encourage other large shareholders to increase their ownership or reduce the excess control
rights by the controlling shareholders, in exchange for more favourable loan contracts. The
empirical results in this research also echo the measures taken by the authorities to encourage
better corporate governance of listed firms by recommending changes in the two-tier board
structure, which is of great importance in protecting banks. For example, we provide support
for recent regulatory and listing requirements (see the newly amended Chinese Corporate

11

ST stands for “Special Treatment”, which is an indication of listed firms’ irregular financial statements. In
particular, a listed firm is flagged with ST if it has negative profits for two consecutive years. This measure can
indicate that a firm has a higher credit risk.
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Law 2005) concerning more actively involved and professional boards of supervisors, with
the evidence that more professional supervisors are associated with lower collateral pledged.
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Appendix.
Estimation results of other equations from the simultaneous equation system (corresponding to the
collateral equation in column 3 of Table 6)
Board size Independent Excess
Top2_10
Guarantee
ROA
Collateral
0.27**
-0.05***
-0.09***
-0.03***
-0.56***
-0.05***
(2.16)
(-2.76)
(-4.30)
(-2.99)
(-28.74)
(-4.93)
Board
0.07
-0.02*
0.08***
0.01
0.02**
(0.92)
(1.84)
(4.87)
(0.24)
(2.08)
Indep
-0.75***
0.46***
2.57**
-0.05
0.03***
(-2.98)
(4.75)
(2.26)
(-1.42)
(3.76)
Duality
-0.24*
-0.01
-0.06
0.02
0.06
-0.01
(-1.93)
(-0.83)
(-1.19)
(0.16)
(0.32)
(-0.34)
SB size
0.37***
-0.01
0.03
-0.05
-0.07
0.01
(8.63)
(-1.17)
(1.59)
(-1.22)
(-1.11)
(0.68)
SB expertise
-0.25**
0.08***
-0.05***
-0.17**
-0.01
0.01*
(-2.11)
(4.13)
(-4.60)
(-2.49)
(-0.38)
(1.73)
NonSOE
0.66***
-0.02*
0.07***
0.48***
0.08***
0.01*
(5.51)
(-1.85)
(12.49)
(6.09)
(4.59)
(1.89)
Top2_10
0.34***
0.08
-0.08***
-0.36***
0.05**
(4.97)
(1.28)
(-5.18)
(-6.03)
(2.32)
Excess
0.02**
0.03
-0.02***
0.02**
-0.00
(2.01)
(0.66)
(-5.18)
(2.04)
(-0.17)
Segment
0.15**
(2.23)
Firm age
0.03**
(2.16)
Industry
average
0.18**
excess control rights
(2.52)
Industry
average
0.68**
other
large
(2.19)
shareholding
Lagged Guarantee
0.06**
(1.99)
Lagged ROA
0.45***
(8.12)
Over-identification 0.67
0.51
0.43
0.50
0.41
0.33
test
Adjusted R2
0.23
0.31
0.23
0.27
0.32
0.26
Observations
3194
3194
3194
3194
3194
3194
The table reports the estimation results of other equations of the simultaneous equation system, corresponding to
the collateral equation in column 3 of Table 6. Only key variables as well as the instrument variables are
reported. P-values are also reported for over-identification tests for examining the exogeneity of instrument
variables. T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the standard error with small-sample correction.
*, **and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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